ISIS has brought terrorist propaganda to a new level, targeting its main audiences in nearly two dozen languages with up to 90,000 tweets every day. Governments have generally been at a loss as how to counter the ISIS narrative with persuasive counter-arguments to reduce its attraction for rebellious Muslim youths in Western diasporas and Muslim-majority countries. At the core of ISIS' narrative are themes familiar to most Muslims. ISIS has appropriated and instrumentalised them for its main purpose: to expand the Caliphate proclaimed in mid-2014. In this Research Paper, Dr. Alex Schmid identifies a dozen narrative themes of ISIS and discusses them from theological, historical and other angles in an attempt to show vulnerabilities and point the way towards developing convincing counter-arguments. While the potential of this approach is demonstrated, Dr. Schmid argues that a concerted and systematic approach, based on synergetic, inter-disciplinary teamwork, is required to develop successful counternarratives and that these need to be tested on audiences with a cultural affinity to ISIS main target groups before being utilised by credible Muslim voices who wish to engage terrorist ideologues and their potential followers with rational and faith-based arguments. The Research Paper concludes with the observation that developing counter-narratives, while necessary, is not enough. It is even more necessary to develop credible alternative narratives -narratives that can give a new sense of purpose, meaning and hope to those who feel that they have no future in their and our societies. 
2 Almost as much, however, it is the product of the will to power of a branch of a broader Islamist movement that has been active in Iraq for more than a decade, following the American intervention in Iraq in 2003.
Since 15 May 2010, ISIS has been led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who spent some five years in American captivity in the Bucca prison in Iraq, where he was forging ties with imprisoned officers from Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime right under the eyes of the American prison authorities.
3 ISIS, a jihadi takfiri 4 terrorist organisation, now controls, to varying degrees, almost half of northern Syria and more than one third of northwestern Iraq, together an area larger than Belgium, an area inhabited originally by 5 to 6 million people of whom, however, more than half a million have fled. ISIS follows a totalitarian and genocidal project comparable in some ways to the one of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in the late 1970s, with Shiites being the main targets. While estimates about the size of ISIS range from as low as 20,000 people to as high as 100,000 people and beyond, 5 this is not enough to hold and govern such a vast territory with millions of people, except by a regime of terror under which a so far unknown (but high) number of people have been demonstratively killed in order to intimidate the rest. 6 While controlling substantial areas of land -something unusual for terrorist organisations -ISIS is also very much present in cyberspace, on the Internet where its claims too often go unchallenged. With its propaganda in the social media, and with some of its video footage also broadcast in mainstream media, ISIS has caught the imagination of a considerable number of young rebellious Muslims all over the world who are attracted by its violent messages and catchy slogans. Its apparent success has also led to a number of instant conversions to Islam among mainly marginalised non-Muslim youths in Western countries. At the same time, it has also filled with terror those who have to endure its harsh rule and those who are facing fanatical ISIS fighters at the front lines in Syria and Iraq. The media campaign of ISIS is very professional by any standards, with highquality visual footage and well-crafted ideological statements attracting young Muslims and some recent converts to Islam to join its ranks. Per day, ISIS produces up to 90,000 tweets and other social media responses -a volume 1 This text is a revised version of a presentation given on 8 December 2014 at a workshop in Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, in Abu Dhabi. The author wish to thank Prof. Rüdiger Lohlker, Dr. Philipp Holtmann, Dr. Milena Uhlmann, Dr. Ugur Ümit Üngör and Dr. Christophe Paulussen for commenting on an earlier version of this text. Responsibility for any shortcomings rests with the author alone. 2 According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the Syrian government has killed at least 109,347 civilians since 2011 (including 15,149 children and 13,695 women). 5,892 persons were tortured to death. -Cit. Simon S. Cordall. "How ISIS Governs Its Caliphate". Newsweek, 2 December 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/2014/12/12/how-isis-governs-its-caliphate-288517.html. The repression of Sunnis in Iraq under Maliki was on a lesser scale but includes summary executions of Sunni prisoners by Iraqi security forces, according to Human Rights Watch. (Cit. ibid.) 3 M. M. Gunter, "Why can't we defeat ISIS", Hurst, 17 October 2014, http://www.hurstpublishers.com/cant-defeat-isis/#at_pco=cod-1.0&at_si=5479ca0c4d775ae5&at_ab=per-4&at_pos=1&at_tot=8. 4 Takfir refers to the practice of excommunicating Muslims judged to be insufficiently dedicated to their faith and to sharia rule. Pronouncing against someone takfir turns those targeted into unbelievers (kufar) who can be killed. (http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1229?_hi=6&_pos=15) 5 Zack Beauchamp, "ISIS is losing", VOX, 24 February 2015, http://www.vox.com/2015/2/23/8085197/is-isis-losing. 6 A report of the UN Commission on Human Rights found that ISIS "….seeks to subjugate civilian under its control and dominate every aspect of their lives through terror, indoctrination, and the provision of services to those who obey." United Nations Commission on Human Rights, "Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic", 14 November 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/HRC_CRP_ISIS_14Nov2014.pdf, p. 13. of activity unmatched by government counter-messaging. 7 According to the American FBI director, James Comey, ISIS has been issuing statements in almost two dozen languages.
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In order to break the present momentum of ISIS, the use of military force in Iraq and Syria is not enough. What is needed is a counter-narrative that can seriously challenge and undermine the narrative of ISIS. To craft such a counter-narrative is also necessary to slow down if not stop the flow of misled foreign fighters to ISIS. So far, more than 20,000 foreign fighters from more than 100 countries have gone to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS and other jihadist organisations in this cross-border theatre of war. 9 More than 4,000 of the foreign fighters are said to originate from Western democracies, with most of them having an immigration background.
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In the following, an attempt will be made to provide arguments to counter a dozen claims of ISIS which form key parts of its narrative. The counter-messaging arguments suggested below might, after further refinement, be utilised in counter-speech acts by those trying to argue with young Muslims who wish to join the ranks of foreign fighters. A similar attempt has been made, from a purely theological perspective, by a group of 152 leading Islamic scholars who, in September 2014 -some three months after the proclamation of the Caliphate -wrote a letter to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, outlining what they consider to be errors and violations of Islamic and international laws committed by the leaders and followers of ISIS. Here is a sample of their 24 objections:
It is forbidden in Islam to force people to convert; It is forbidden in Islam to deny women their rights; It is forbidden in Islam to kill the innocent; The re-introduction of slavery is forbidden in Islam; It is forbidden in Islam to torture people; It is forbidden in Islam to declare a caliphate without consensus from all Muslims; Loyalty to one's nation is permissible in Islam; After the death of the Prophet … Islam does not require anyone to emigrate anywhere; Jihad in Islam is defensive war.
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While some experts claim that the appeal of ISIS has little or nothing to do with religion but is more a reflection of a youth revolt among Muslims, and a counter-culture response and search of identity among converts, the position taken here is that ideology and religion are crucial and central for legitimising jihadist 7 Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS Message", The New York Times, 16 February 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/us-intensifies-effort-to-blunt-isis-message.html?_r=0. 8 Cit. Lemma "Islamic State of Iraq and Levant" in Wikipedia (engl.). I would avoid referring to Wikipedia since anybody can change the content. However, the sources mentioned on the Wikipedia page can be referred to. 9 "UN says '25,000 foreign fighters' joined Islamist militants", BBC, 2 April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32156541. The respective figures for other conflicts are much lower: 5,000 foreign fighters went to Afghanistan between 1979 and 1992 these are indeed the numbers Zelin is presenting, but it may be good to mention as well that others have come with higher numbers, see for instance Hegghammer (5,000-20,000), p. 61, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/The_Rise_of_Muslim_Foreign_Fighters.pdf; 1,000 to Chechnya in the 1990s, 1,000 to Afghanistan in the 1990s, 1,000 to Afghanistan after 9/11; 4,000 to Iraq between 2003 and 2007 compared to 10,000 -20,000 to Syria between 2012 and January 2015. More than 5,000 of them have been killed. -Aaron Y. Zelin, "The Islamic State: A Video Introduction", The Washington Institute, 13 January 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/theislamic-state-a-video-introduction . 12 This is also a position taken by Graeme Wood. In his article "What ISIS Really Wants", he writes: "Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, "the Prophetic methodology," which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn't actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it. We'll need to get acquainted with the Islamic State's intellectual genealogy if we are to react in a way that will not strengthen it, but instead help it selfimmolate in its own excessive zeal. -G. Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants", The Atlantic, March 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. 13 Addressing the United Nations Security Council in September 2014, the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott said: "To use this term [Islamic State] is to dignify a death cult; a death cult that, in declaring itself a caliphate, has declared war on the world". V. Michael, "Islamic State: PM Tony Abbott tells UN Australia's response to terrorist group will be 'utterly unflinching'". ABC News (Australia), 25 September 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-25/tony-abbott-speaks-at-un-general-assembly/5767576. 14 These claims have been identified by TRI Research Associate Dr. Philipp Holtmann, based on his ongoing analysis of ISIS' Internet output. 15 A more comprehensive critique would draw from at least ten different sources and frameworks: (1) history of Islam; (2) four main Islamic jurisprudential schools and their fatwas; (3) international humanitarian law; (4) moral standards as they exist in human rights documents, including Islamic and Arabian human rights texts; (5) the (political) self-interest of the constituency for which ISIS claims to speak; (6) the special interests of women and religious minorities; (7) the juxtaposition of ISIS' own practices with its declaratory policies; (8) witness accounts of people who have broken ranks with the Islamic State; (9) victim and survivor accounts of those who have experienced ISIS' practices first-hand; (10) internal documents from ISIS found on computers and in safe houses. Let us look at some of the main claims, slogans and statements of ISIS.
Twelve Claims by ISIS and Arguments to Counter These
Claim No. 1:
ISIS claims that it stands for pure and unadulterated Islam

Ad 1: Argumentative elements for possible incorporation into a Counter-Message
The historical record (as opposed to faith-based accounts) offers only dim glimpses of the origins of Islam in its first decades of existence. Therefore any effort to return to the golden age of the first three generations of successors of the Prophet involves, to some degree, the (re-) invention of a lost tradition.
Allah "revealed" himself over a period of 23 years to Muhammad, whose words were written down by others only after his death in 632 CE. A multiplicity of Muslim interpretations exists on the Quran, on Muhammad's exemplary way of life and on Islamic law (sharia). These can be used to challenge ISIS and its claim to a monopoly of interpretation. This fact could be emphasised to encourage a more skeptical view among susceptible target audiences towards ISIS' argument that it represents the "pure and unadulterated Islam".
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Some critical scientific studies, which have attempted to get closer to the oldest versions of the Quran, have come up with findings that tend to challenge Salafist interpretations. Some of the Quran researchers who deal with the etymology of the sacred text claim that this also concerns crucial topics, such as the rewards of a "martyr" in paradise: when being retranslated, they suggest that the heavenly reward of huri might consist of sweet white raisins rather than virgins. 19 This could be an entry for degrading certain doctrines and key discourses of ISIS. The claim of ISIS to stand for "pure and unadulterated Islam" therefore is just that -a claim among other claims with no better proof of correctness. However, by their close (but superficial) imitation of alleged and partly real historical practices from the early days ) which stress the importance of expanding Islam "by the sword", i.e. by war. 27 But the Prophet is also quoted as saying "let there be no compulsion in religion". 28 The problem of contradictory messages of the Messenger of God is "solved" by some militant interpreters of Islam with the claim that the later (more intolerant) statements of the Quran from the Medina period invalidate the (more conciliatory) earlier statements of the Prophet from his period in Mecca.
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Salafis are supremacists who regard other "People of the Book" as second class citizens in Muslim societies. In the view of the jihadi extremists among them (as opposed to the more peaceful, quietist conservative Salafis), "People of the Book" and unbelievers who do not submit to rules set by them, can be subjugated, enslaved, expelled or even killed. This view is widely contested by mainstream Islam. One of the problems of religious texts -not just the Quran -is that statements that are time-and context-specific are taken out of context and taken literally and applied ad hoc and at will to fit new situations. This is also true for those passages in the Quran that advocate killing of non-believers (e.g. Surah 9:5). Yet the Quran contains also passages that oppose the killing of innocent people (e.g. the often-quoted Surah 5:32) 30 . Fact is that the Quran and the Hadiths can be read and have been interpreted by Muslim scholars in different ways; for almost every example one can find a counter-example and, in some cases, even a counter-counter-example.
Claim No. 4:
According to some ISIS clerics, civil strife (fitna) is a positive thing because in its course the true believers (ISIS) come to the surface, distinguishing them from the heretics and hypocrites. 31 Ad 4: Argumentative elements for possible incorporation into a Counter-Message "Fitna" literally means "to burn", but is also referring to temptation, probation, to put to the test, distress, discord, riot, civil strife, rebellion against the divine order. Fitna is seen as a situation to be avoided at almost all costs by mainstream Islam. The term has multiple, all negative, uses, referring inter alia to "sedition" and "trial" (testing by temptation) which can lead to deserting one's faith. 32 The Prophet himself called fitna "worse than killing" in the Quran. 33 The first major civil war of the Islamic Caliphate, lasting from 656-661, is generally referred to as the "First Fitna". Some of the supporters of ISIS apparently see fitna as not that destructive, because in their view the ummah is in such a catastrophic shape that civil strife can only lead to a better situation. they might use the word in the sense of "to put to test" which is but one of the word's many meanings. Even if we accept that interpretation, the question remains by what test "heretics" and "hypocrites" can be distinguished from "true believers". There is no historical record that any of the various fitan (plural of fitna) since the 7 th century were of any help in distinguishing "true believers" from "hypocrites" and "heretics", as ISIS claims. As to the "true" in "true believers": ISIS followers and sympathisers should be confronted with alternative Islamic narratives, which stand for open and rational interpretations of Islam as these existed for centuries not just in the rich medieval history of Islamic civilisations but right until the 19 th century and beyond. 34 In this way,
Muslims might be able to challenge the "truth vs. untruth" discourse of ISIS-followers and help to highlight more nuanced Islam interpretations. Truth is an elusive concept; most religions claim to be in possession of the final truth; yet their "truths" are often contradicting each other and many of them are even internally contradictory within one religion. 35 One thing is sure: "truth" cannot be established by intimidating and decapitating those whose arguments cannot be successfully countered by means of logic, reason and empirical testing. While ISIS can kill people and destroy monuments of humanity's cultural heritage, it cannot kill the ideas that go with them.
Claim No.5:
ISIS claims that a Muslim has to pass through the stage of violent jihad in order to enter paradise. Jihad is even a precondition for the establishment of the ummah, since otherwise no separation can take place between mu'minin (believers), munafiqin (hypocrites) and kuffar (unbelievers). The process of ruthless separation must be continued until the two camps are completely separated: the camp of iman (belief) vs. the camps of nifaq and kufr.
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Ad 5: Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation into a Counter-Message
Jihad has been interpreted in several ways. One distinction is between, on the one hand, the "greater jihad" which means restraining oneself from committing immoral acts considered to be transgressions against divine law and, more generally, striving to become a better person. The "minor jihad" refers, on the one hand, to the defense and the active propagation of faith by armed force. This particular meaning of a violent "holy war" is the prevalent one in the Quran. The first part of this ISIS claim (referring to passing through the stage of violent jihad) appears to be inspired by a hadith attributed to Mohammed which says: "Know that Paradise is under the shades of swords".
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Like thousands of other hadiths, the authenticity of this one can be questioned. 38 The Prophet has said different things under different circumstances, for example, that "Paradise is at the feet of mothers" 39 -a statement hard to combine with the one about the "shades of swords". So which one is (more) correct? It can be argued, based on logical reasoning, that if it is true that the ummah can only be established by the sword, which involves violence, it will lead to resentment and resistance among those coerced into the correct belief - 34 For example, the new interreligious project "House of One" in Berlin offers a discussion forum and prayer rooms for Jews, Christians and Muslims. 35 Truth can be interpreted as "factually correct", "in accordance with reality", "corresponding to the actual state of affairs". A more modest interpretation is that "true" is what (specific groups of) people commonly agree upon at a given moment in time. This leaves open the possibility that science might prove such a common understanding wrong in the future. Philosophers generally take a skeptical view as to our ability to perceive full truth. 36 Jihad in the sense of "greater jihad", as an attempt of each and every one to overcome base instincts in an effort to better one's character by dedication and self-discipline is a valid concept that might, in counternarratives, be stressed over the violent "lesser jihad".
Claim No. 6:
ISIS claims, citing the words of al-Zarqawi, that "the honorable resistance" has noble and great Sharia aims. All jihad exerted by the resistance is for the benefit of the Muslim people. The jihad of the resistance is not a limited jihad to redraw the borders of the Sykes-Picot agreement, but is a worldwide jihad. 42 Zarqawi's resistance against the American intervention was not very "honorable" as claimed by ISIS. His cruelty was such that al Qaeda's second in command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, had to warn him in July 2005 that by killing innocent Muslim Shia civilians he alienated people from al Qaeda (of which Zarqawi's group of fighters were then part). 45 who is said to hold a doctorate in Islamic studies). As to his jihad being for the "benefit of the Muslim people": most of Zarqawi's victims were Shia Muslims. He referred to them as "human scum" and "poisonous snakes".
Ad 6: Argumentative Elements for possible incorporation into a Counter-Message
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The reference to a "worldwide jihad" in ISIS' sixth claim makes clear that it wages a war of aggression rather than one of mere resistance. ISIS has to expand its territory by necessity as its economy model is based on continuous plunder rather than the creation of wealth on the territory it holds. Its systematic murder of tribal leaders in Iraq's al-Anbar province indicates that it seeks to terrorise and subdue Sunni Muslims there rather than work for them and with them.
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Claim No. 7:
ISIS claims that, under present circumstances, Muslim unity becomes mandatory and that therefore it becomes a religious obligation to unify under a single leader. 48 
Ad 7: Argumentative elements for possible incorporation into a Counter-Message
Religious movements have a tendency to split rather than to unify and Islam is no exception to this rule. Its oldest split is the one between Sunni and Shia which is more than 1300 years old and has still not been closed. Within Sunni Islam itself there are, as within Shia Islam, sects and sub-groups, for example the Druze. There is no indication at all that they will unite in the near future. Rather, they are likely, if attacked by ISIS, either to flee or to put up a fight and offer resistance. While more than half a dozen of al Qaeda affiliates have, in recent months, declared allegiance to ISIS, recent splits among some of these affiliates indicate that not everybody is willing to throw in his lot with ISIS.
The call for unity appeals to many in the diverse Islamic worlds, but few are willing to give up their own religious traditions or national aspirations. In the 1960s, the call from Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser for "Arab Unity" did not materialise. It is unlikely that such a call under a different label -religious rather than Arab ethnic -is going to succeed. A public opinion poll among Arab Muslims, conducted by the Doha-based Arab Centre for Research and Policy, surveying public opinion in seven countries, found that 85 percent of respondents had a negative opinion about ISIS. 49 Chances that more Muslims rally behind ISIS are small as the extreme violence (crucifixions, stonings, beheadings, amputations, rapes, mass killings of prisoners) disgust large majorities of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. When ISIS advanced in Iraq, over half a million civilians fled in one week 50 -hardly a sign of welcoming unity under ISIS. The Jordanian-Palestinian writer Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a respected voice among Salafists, has accused ISIL of driving a wedge between Muslims -the very opposite of the unity sought by ISIS.
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46 Ibid., p. 24. 47 To quote an analysis from the Soufan Group: "The Islamic State has given up the fiction of working with the Sunni tribes in the area, and is now waging a campaign of assassination and mass murder to blunt the ability of these tribes to oppose the group from within as it battles Baghdad and the coalition". -The Soufan Group, "War Against All: The Islamic State in Anbar". Intelbrief, 26 November 2014. The report noted that "… the group has murdered almost a thousand Sunni tribesman in the last month, and over 700 from just one tribe, the Albu Nimr. 
Claim No. 8:
ISIS claims to be the bearer of legitimate religious authority over all Muslims which gives it the right to reestablish the caliphate.
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Ad 8: Argumentative elements for possible incorporation into a Counter-Message ISIS has adopted a popular variation of the jihadi standard banner used since the 1980s, a black flag with a white circle in the middle that encloses the seal of the Prophet with the words "God Messenger Muhammad". Its leader has declared himself caliph (meaning a "successor" who was meant to be the vice-regent of Muhammad). The title "caliph" has been used for Islamic rulers overseeing religious and political affairs of an Islamic community, while "caliphate" refers to the territory or state ruled by the caliph. 53 The caliph was originally a politico-religious leader who also acted as supreme military commander (amir al-mu'minin). This dual function has, however, disappeared after the reigns of the first four caliphs. 54 The last (Ottoman) Islamic caliphate came to an end in 1924 when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in his secularisation and modernisation campaign for Turkey, abolished the institution headed by the last caliph Abdulmecid II. After a hiatus of 90 years, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi had himself declared "caliph" of a worldwide caliphate on 29 June 2014. 55 According to one Islamic scholar, Rusydi 'Alyan (in his book Al-Islam wa al-Khilafah, 1996), a "caliph" has to have a "profound knowledge of Sharia law" (which the new caliph probably has) and "being fair, virtuous, dignified, mature and sane", which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has already shown not to be. 56 In Islamic history the caliphate was a contested institution -three out of the first four so-called Rightly Guided (Rashidun) Caliphs (Umar, Uthman and Ali) died by assassination. Discord after the death of the Prophet at the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (632 -661 CE) even reached a point where some of the Prophet's companions called for "jihad against the Caliph". 57 What ISIS presents is a "romanticized history of the Caliphate", The claim that those who join ISIS will get heavenly rewards goes back to numerous verses in the Quran which call for fighting and claim that it is binding upon believers to fulfill God's commands and obey His leadership (hidaya). In exchange, believers will gain heavenly rewards in the Hereafter. 60 However, the IS-discourse is based on an uncompromising, literal and non-contextual interpretation of such verses and can be seriously challenged. Indiscriminate violence and brutal terrorist practices do not deserve any rewards. Credible Muslim opinion makers who interpret these verses in their respective historical and political contexts ought to be involved in any project which challenge the narrative of the Islamic State. In parallel, one should also stress that the sorry history of failed Western policies in Muslim countries must not be countered by attacks against civilians who are not responsible for the misdeeds of some members of political elites. By being self-critical one gains trust and can facilitate the task to inspire Muslim audiences to become more self-critical as well, especially towards inhuman discourses and deeds from members within their own ranks. If the IS-caliphate is indeed the "true land of Islam", moderate Muslims will find it difficult to square such a "truth" with some of the actual practices of ISIS, such as: asked, roughly three-quarters or more Muslims rejected suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians". And in most countries, according to this survey, the prevailing view is that such acts are never justified as a means of defending Islam from its enemies.
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The record of ISIS so far covers the full spectrum of crimes, from individual murder of children to attempted genocide. The gap between the declaratory policy of ISIS -its claim to be the "true land of Islam" -and its actual record of war crimes, gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity on the ground is probably the most powerful argument in efforts to counter the ideological narrative of ISIS. Muslim witnesses to such crimes by ISIS should be given ample voice in counter-narratives.
Claim No. 10:
ISIS claims that there is a wonderful brotherhood among ISIS-followers. Every capable person should rush forward to join this brotherhood and perform emigration (hijrah) to the land of jihad, or at least spiritual emigration away from the values of the infidel societies in which many Muslim live. 64 
Ad 10: Argumentative elements for possible incorporation into a Counter-Message
The claim of a brotherhood among the ISIS fighters has elements of truth as it is well known that men tend to bond in battle. However, there are also tales coming from the ranks of ISIS of bitter disputes. Given the fact that Muslims fight Muslims in Syria and Iraq and jihad refers to the defense of the faith against unbelievers, it is difficult to view the conflict in Syria (and its spill-over into Iraq) as a "jihad". As the Singapore-based Religious Rehabilitation Group, in a brochure over "The Syrian Conflict" writes:
The conflict in Syria has led to confusion about the obligation of jihad among many Muslims. Many Muslims are being misled into thinking that fighting in Syria is an act of jihad. This is not true. The Syrian conflict is a sectarian war among Muslims in Syria. It is about political power and influence and determining who has control of land and resources.(…) It is not about defending the faith of the ummah. 65 Some of the foreign fighters who flocked to Syria and Iraq have begun to realise this and disillusionment has set in. The tales of those who return home disillusioned are feared by ISIS. More than 100 foreign fighters who tried to make it back home have been executed by ISIS, apparently in an effort to prevent some uncomfortable truths from gaining publicity. 66 Among those who stay, whether or not the "wonderful brotherhood" remains "wonderful" can also be doubted. What many of these foreign fighters tend to forget are the long-term consequences of wartime traumas on their mental health. Veterans often become depressed and not infrequently suicidal without appropriate psychological counseling. Given the lack of Arabic language and military skills among many foreign fighters, many of those who have joined ISIS have been used as "cannon fodder" in frontline positions and for suicide attacks. The military pressure on ISIS has put its attempts at state-building on the backburner -where it is likely to remain.
Claim No. 12:
ISIS claims that it is capable of hitting Western interests all over the world by means of its affiliates, with the number of highly motivated, dedicated followers growing by the day. 69 range command and control pattern, in which ideology and strategic guidance via the media are supposed to inspire, if not guide supporters' attacks in the West. 70 However, this strategy of provoking Western democracies backfires against ISIS goal to consolidate its "Islamic States" in parts of Syria and Iraq a viable state. Attacks in the West will only strengthen the resolve of the coalition of more than sixty states that has been brought together by the United States to fight ISIS. This coalition includes Western, neutral and Muslim countries. The escalation potential of these states is infinitely greater than the one of ISIS. By taking on the whole world, ISIS -which might have had a chance of survival as a Sunni state next to a Kurdish and a Shia state in a fragmenting Iraq -is digging its own grave. It might take months or even years but ISIS as a state (not as an underground terrorist movement) looks doomed. Losing ground in Syria and in Iraq, it is likely that ISIS might seek to regroup in other places. On the other hand, its internal divisions might break it up before it can break out. While each of its acts of terrorism has produced terror, even more so, it also produces resistance to terror. Nonetheless, in the short and medium term the group is a major destabiliser in the region. Its apocalyptic belief that the End of Times is near and that the final battle will be fought and won in Dabiq (Syria), accounts for its fanaticism.
ISIS' military strength and the degree of support it receives from former Baathist officers and Sunni tribes in Anbar is subject to speculation and dispute; one account mentions some 25,000 fighters of which about half are foreigners and the remainder come from Syria and Iraq while others arrive at higher estimates. 71 Of the more than 5,000 foreign fighters who came from Western countries, many have already died, some have decided to remain in the Islamic Caliphate and some have returned while others who wanted to return have reportedly been killed by ISIS to avoid that they could reveal some ugly truths upon return. How high the threat emanating from those who have returned to the West is, is difficult to assess beforehand. The claim that ISIS is "capable of hitting Western interests all over the world", has so far been an exaggeration.
Conclusion
This exercise of taking a number of ISIS claims and attempting to counter them has shown the potential of this approach -not more. What is needed is a concerted and systematic approach, based on synergetic interdisciplinary teamwork, aimed at developing counter-messages, counter-speech, counter-arguments and counternarratives. Subsequently, these have to be tested with audiences that have a cultural affinity to the main target groups. As far as Western democracies are concerned, the target group consists of vulnerable young Muslims who might become foreign fighters or domestic terrorists if they are not stopped on their trajectory of radicalisation. After such testing and appropriate re-calibration of texts, counter-arguments and messages like the ones tentatively sketched here might be ready for use by credible Muslim voices who wish to engage terrorist ideologues and their potential followers with rational or faith-based arguments. It is vital that Muslim scholars are involved in all phases of developing such counter-narratives, not just at the delivery end. While the jihadist ideologues themselves might well be beyond their reach due to the fanatically closed minds ("Salafists only listen to Salafists", as one of them put it), rebellious young men tempted by Salafist jihadi messages might still be susceptible to the voice of reason, appealing to their own self-interest and to the their inner voice of humanity, the voice of their better self which is also the one of the "greater jihad".
Terrorism is a combination of violence and propaganda. Counter-terrorism has so far mainly targeted the former and neglected the latter. The use of kinetic force against terrorists in the "war on terror" has, in more than a decade of counter-terrorism, in many cases been unproductive and downright counter-productive in other cases. It has been very costly in terms of lives and money lost. On the other hand, efforts to counter the ideology that drives terrorism have not made much progress in all these years, for lack of funding as well as for lack of development of effective and tested soft power instruments that target the hearts and minds of would-be jihadists. It is high time to invest more in developing better counter-messages and more persuasive counternarratives which appeal to Muslims on both the emotional and the intellectual level.
Since counter-narratives are only defensive, it is even more necessary to develop credible alternative narratives -narratives that can give a new sense of purpose, meaning and hope to those who feel that they have no future in their and our societies. Those in positions of authority have to show them that we do not live in blocked societies where positive change can come only by means of violence. Policymakers have to listen not only to the grievances of young people but also address their hopes and their expectations for the future and they have to enable young people to actively shape their own future in pluralistic, open societies. The destructiveness of terrorism has to be shown to be futile and has to be opposed by a new constructiveness.
